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Abstract	and	Keywords
This	chapter	aims	to	place	the	Arab	uprisings	of	2011	in	historical	perspective,	addressing	questions	of	change	and
continuity	by	comparing	and	contrasting	these	uprisings	with	previous	cases	of	contentious	mobilization	in	the	region,
going	back	to	the	nineteenth	century.	The	chapter	argues	that	the	uprisings	can	be	linked	to	growing	protests	against
domestic	regimes	in	the	region	since	the	1970s,	and	are	similar	to	people-power	uprisings	in	other	parts	of	the	world.
The	chapter	points	to	the	under-researched	democratic	genealogies	of	these	uprisings,	arguing	that	these	played	an
important	role	in	securing	the	unity	of	contentious	crowds.	The	mass	uprisings	had	their	surprising	and	creative
dimensions;	they	emerged	without	any	preceding	state	breakdown	and	they	constituted	the	people	as	a	sovereign
subject	in	a	way	distinctive	from	anticolonial	nationalism.
Keywords:	uprisings,	social	movements,	contentious	mobilization,	political	hegemony,	people	power,	participatory	democracy
This	chapter	aims	to	put	the	Arab	uprisings	of	2011	into	historical	perspective.	It	takes	the	road	less	traveled	by	focusing
not	on	the	actions	and	reactions	of	powerful	and	established	collective	actors,	such	as	the	military,	or	on	systems,	such	as
crony	capitalism	or	the	new	media,	but	on	the	mass	uprisings	themselves.	These	uprisings	are	forms	of	contentious
mobilization	that	involved	the	new	and	forceful	political	intervention	of	diverse	masses	of	previously	unpoliticized
subaltern	actors.	The	chapter	has	two	tasks.	The	first	is	to	develop	arguments	about	what	sorts	of	contexts,	antecedents,
and	comparisons,	both	within	and	beyond	the	region,	can	help	to	identify	and	explain	the	uprisings.	A	danger	here	is
determinism	and	the	apparent	wisdom	of	hindsight.	The	second,	related	task	is	to	identify	what	was	new,	distinctive,	and
creative	in	these	uprisings,	and	to	find	ways	to	understand	such	active	forms	of	agency,	without	explaining	them	away	in
terms	of	something	other	than	themselves.
This	chapter	argues	that	these	uprisings,	distinctively	directed	against	domestic	regimes	that	had	previously	incarnated
anticolonial	nationalism,	can	be	compared	to	uprisings	against	domestic	regimes	in	the	region	before	1914,	and	can	be
contextualized	fruitfully	in	terms	of	rising	protest	against	domestic	regimes	since	the	1970s.	It	is	proposed	that	the
important	context	for	these	uprisings	is	the	thinning	of	the	political	hegemony	of	domestic	regimes	in	the	region	since
that	time.	The	chapter	highlights	the	uprisings’	democratic	genealogies,	which	played	a	role	in	making	crowd	unity
possible.	These	uprisings	are	compared	to	people-power	uprisings	in	other	parts	of	the	world	and	new	forms	of	radically
democratic	activism.
As	for	the	second	task,	it	is	argued	that	the	mass	uprisings—historical	comparisons	and	explanatory	contexts
notwithstanding—were	surprising	and	creative.	Like	the	Iranian	revolution	of	1978–9,	their	emergence	was	surprising
because	it	was	not	preceded	by	state	breakdown,	military	defeat,	or	fiscal	crisis,	and	their	course	was	unpredictable
because	they	were	capable	in	some	instances	of	ousting	dictators.	It	is	argued	that	the	constitution	of	the	people	as	an
active,	rights-bearing,	and	sovereign	subject,	distinct	in	important	ways	from	the	people	of	anticolonial	nationalism,	was
one	of	the	most	important	innovations	at	work	in	2011;	this	was	a	creative	act	that	was	fortified	by	new	networked	modes
of	organizing,	and	new	strategies	and	tactics	such	as	occupation	of	public	squares	and	pitched	battles	with	police.	In
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closing	the	chapter	considers	some	of	the	weaknesses	of	people-power	uprisings,	suggesting	that	unity	in	the	face	of
segmentation	is	one	of	the	most	fundamental	conditions	of	success	for	this	form	of	contentious	mobilization.
Popular	Uprisings	that	Brought	Down	Presidents	for	Life
The	Arab	uprisings	of	2011	were	new	in	that	for	the	first	time	since	independence	the	domestic	regime	of	an	Arab	state
or	at	least	the	real	head	of	the	regime	was	brought	down	by	a	mass	popular	uprising.	When	the	Tunisian	army	refused	to
open	fire	on	masses	of	civilian	protestors,	Bin	Ali,	the	strongman	president	there	since	1987,	boarded	a	plane	to	Saudi
Arabia	on	January	14,	2011	and	did	not	return.	Mass	uprisings	in	Egypt,	Libya,	Bahrain,	Yemen,	and	Syria	followed	the	fall
of	Bin	Ali,	along	with	protests	in	many	other	parts	of	the	region.	In	little	more	than	a	year,	three	more	dictators	of	long
tenure	fell	or	were	dislodged	from	power,	albeit	in	increasingly	complicated	and	indirect	ways.	Most	dramatic	was	the
ousting	on	February	11,	2011	of	Hosni	Mubarak	of	Egypt,	president	of	the	Arab	world’s	most	populous	state	since	1981.
He	was	a	leader	that	many	doubted	would	be	“let	go”	by	the	United	States	because	of	the	latter’s	interest	in	maintaining
the	Camp	David	Accords	of	1979	securing	an	Egyptian–Israeli	peace.	This	assumption	was	disproved	after	only	eighteen
days	of	protest.	On	October	20,	2011	Colonel	Gaddafi	of	Libya,	president	since	1969,	was	killed	after	losing	control	of	the
country.	On	February	27,	2012	‘Ali	‘Abdullah	Saliḥ	of	Yemen,	president	since	1990,	finally	ceded	power	by	negotiation.
It	was	the	toppling	of	these	dictators,	in	large	measure	as	a	result	of	popular	protest,	that	was	so	extraordinary	and
unexpected	for	virtually	everybody,	from	activists	to	academics.	Retrospective	claims	to	prescience	rang	hollow.	Even	the
Egyptian	economist	and	public	intellectual	Galal	Amin,	who	came	as	close	to	predicting	the	uprisings	as	any	public
figure,	nonetheless	in	his	first	substantial	publication	after	Mubarak’s	fall	only	emphasized	the	surprise	that	Egypt	had
experienced.
Historians	with	the	benefit	of	hindsight	are	supposed	to	demonstrate	the	many	ways	in	which	these	uprisings	were
entirely	explicable	in	terms	of	contexts	and	antecedents.	On	the	other	hand,	the	historians’	task	is	also	to	return	to	the
moment	and	recapture,	in	historicizing	mode,	the	surprise	that	such	events	evoked	at	the	time.	In	this	latter	sense,	a
historical	perspective	suggests	that	surprise	was	a	perfectly	reasonable	response.	Even	regime	change,	let	alone	one
originating	in	popular	protest,	was	something	of	an	innovation	in	the	recent	history	of	the	region.	All	but	one	of	the	ruling
regimes	in	the	independent	states	of	the	Arab	world	had	endured,	with	personnel	changes	only,	since	Colonel	Gaddafi’s
Free	Officers’	revolutionary	coup	seized	power	from	King	Idris	in	Libya	under	the	banner	of	pan-Arab	national	liberation
in	1969.	External	powers	had	generally	been	content	to	work	with,	support,	and	succor	the	antidemocratic	“devil	they
knew.” 	The	only	partial	exception	was	Iraq.	Saddam	Hussein’s	strongman	rule	there	since	the	1970s,	having	been
supported	by	the	United	States	in	the	1980s,	was	broken	by	the	US	invasion	of	2003.	This	was	an	exception	that	seemed
to	prove	a	simple	rule:	the	people	could	not	bring	down	the	regime.	The	mass	uprising	of	1991	in	Iraq,	we	note,	was
smothered	in	blood. 	Probably	the	most	significant	popular	uprising	of	recent	times	in	the	region,	the	Palestinian	intifada
of	1987–1991,	did	not	topple	a	domestic	regime.	It	was	directed	not	at	a	domestic	dictatorship	but	a	colonizing
occupation,	and	was	eventually	repressed	and	demobilized,	although	it	did	make	a	mighty	contribution	to	what	became
the	Oslo	process	in	the	1990s.	Even	fifteen	years	of	Lebanese	civil	war	(1975–1990)—which	after	the	defeat	of	the
Leftist	Palestinian	forces	in	1976	following	the	Syrian	military	intervention—was	a	many-sided	conflict	that	did	not	sweep
away	the	consociational	and	sect-based	political	system. 	The	“independence	intifada”	in	Lebanon	in	2005	was	a
formidable	display	of	people	power,	involved	the	sustained	occupation	of	a	central	urban	square,	and	led	to	the
withdrawal	of	the	Syrian	army	which	had	lain	a	controlling	hand	on	the	country	since	1976. 	It	did	not,	however,	lead	to
the	fall	or	major	reform	of	the	domestic	regime,	which	was	reconstituted	on	relatively	familiar	lines.	The	Bahrainis	did	not
bring	down	the	sectarian	monarchy	there	through	the	long	uprising	of	the	1990s,	although	certain	political	concessions
were	won	in	the	early	2000s.
Bread	riots	and	crowd	actions	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	were	able	to	slow	the	pace	of	International	Monetary	Fund-led
structural	adjustment.	They	did	not	bring	down	regimes	and,	in	the	main,	did	not	seek	to.	The	resurgence	of	strike	action
among	industrial	workers	and	civil	servants	in	Egypt	after	2004	only	blunted	privatization. 	Further,	it	is	important	to	note
that	the	vast	energies	of	Islamist	movements,	many	of	which	did	target	the	“Near	Enemy”	for	revolution,	failed	to	topple
a	single	regime	in	the	Arab	world. 	The	assassination	of	Egyptian	President	Anwar	Sadat	by	Islamists	in	1981	did	not	spark
the	anticipated	popular	uprising	or	dislodge	the	rule	of	the	military.	The	electoral	route	pursued	by	the	Front	Islamique
du	Salut	(FIS)	in	Algeria	after	the	constitutional	opening	of	1989,	in	turn	a	result	of	the	popular	protest	of	October	1988,
led	to	the	cancellation	of	elections	in	1992	and	a	bloody	civil	war.	None	of	this,	however,	dislodged	or	even	fundamentally
reformed	le	pouvoir	in	Algeria.
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Many	among	the	urban	and	slum-based	poor	were	hunkered	down	before	2011,	thinking	less	of	revolution	or	even
reform,	and	more	about	migration	opportunities	abroad	and	survivalism	at	home.	This	meant	“weapons	of	the	weak”:	the
use	of	informal	networks,	the	“quiet	encroachment	of	the	ordinary,”	the	maintenance	of	a	certain	presence	in	the	streets
and	slums,	and	everyday	modes	of	resistance	in	order	to	acquire	goods	and	services	and	make	claims	on	the	propertied
and	powerful. 	Although	street	politics,	from	Tehran	to	Cairo,	involved	discontinuous	confrontation	with	police	and
government	officials,	it	nonetheless	avoided	overt,	organized	collective	action,	the	elaboration	of	a	political	program,	or
oppositional	ideology,	or	costly	outright	assault	on	the	regime.	In	this	regard,	the	masses	were	an	object	of	great
perplexity	to	those	such	as	the	Egyptian	novelist	Alaa	al-Aswany	who	wondered	in	2010	why	they	did	not	rise	up	in	the
face	of	many	forms	of	oppression. 	His	book	on	this	issue	was	republished	in	the	aftermath	of	the	uprisings,	now	framed
as	an	explanation	for	the	revolution. 	No	such	comparable	event	had	unfolded	in	Israel	or	Turkey	before	2011.	The
Green	movement	in	Iran	in	2009	was	an	important	uprising	around	a	seemingly	stolen	election,	but	it	mobilized	fewer
participants	than	the	Arab	uprisings,	and	it	did	not	bring	down	the	president,	the	supreme	leader,	or	the	regime.
The	only	partially	comparable	event	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	in	recent	times	took	place	in	Iran	in	1978–79.
Here	was	a	mass,	popular,	nonviolent	uprising	directed	victoriously	against	a	domestic	regime	that	had	not	suffered	a
prior	state	breakdown,	recent	defeat	in	war,	major	fiscal	crisis,	blow	to	its	repressive	capacities,	or	peasant	rebellion.
Both	the	Arab	uprisings	and	the	Iranian	revolution	shared	this	“unthinkable”	feature,	and	were	hence	surprising	in	this
basic	way. 	The	spectacle	of	urban	avenues	and	squares	filled	with	millions	of	protestors,	accompanied	by	institutional
disruption	occasioned	by	strike	action	and	civil	disobedience	on	a	major	scale,	was	in	some	respects	regionally	pioneered
in	Iran	in	late	1978.
Apart	from	these	important	similarities,	however,	the	Iranian	revolution	of	1978–79	exhibited	many	vital	differences	to	the
Arab	uprisings	of	2011.	In	point	of	context,	it	was	partly	unfinished	business	from	the	neocolonial	moment	of	1953	when
the	United	States	engineered	a	coup	to	re-establish	the	Pahlavi	Shah	on	an	authoritarian	basis	against	the	democratic
constitutional	system,	after	the	elected	prime	minister,	Muhammad	Mossadeq	sought	economic	independence	through
the	nationalization	of	the	Anglo-Iranian	Oil	Company. 	In	point	of	activism,	the	revolution	of	1978–79	involved	a
determined	revolutionary	leadership	with	a	long	track	record	going	back	to	the	1960s.	It	had	a	strong	organizational	core
among	Khomeini’s	seminary	networks	and	leaders.	It	expressed	a	clear	ideological	program	with	regard	to	the
reorganization	of	the	state	along	Shi’a	republican	lines,	a	program	that	had	been	under	development	since	the	late	1950s
in	Shi’a	clerical	circles	in	Najaf,	Karbala,	and	Qom. 	In	Iran,	a	version	of	politicized	Shi’ism,	complete	with
socioeconomic	dimensions	and	identified	with	the	figure	of	Ayatollah	Khomeini,	hegemonized	much	of	the	protest.	In
Iran,	guerrilla	groups	were	present	to	deliver	the	coup	de	grâce	to	the	shah’s	imperial	guard.	And	after	the	fall	of	the
shah,	revolutionary	transformation	was	driven	forward	by	the	revolutionary	leadership:	the	Pahlavi	monarchy	was	replaced
with	an	Islamic	republic	in	ways	that	involved	rapid	and	far-reaching	social,	economic,	cultural,	and	political	change.
With	regard	to	the	Arab	uprisings,	by	contrast,	the	domestic	regimes	targeted	were	not	installed	by	the	United	States,	but
were,	with	the	exception	of	Bahrain,	the	heirs	(Saliḥ,	al-Asad,	Bin	Ali,	Mubarak)	and	even	direct	protagonists	(Gaddafi)	of
the	anticolonial,	nationalist,	and	revolutionary	traditions	of	the	1950s	and	1960s.	Moreover,	the	various	strands	of	Sunni-
modernist	and	Salafi-Wahhabi	activism	mostly	got	organized	after	the	uprisings	had	broken	out:	they	did	not	lead	the
action	or	hegemonize	its	constituencies,	whose	slogans	were	universal	and	secular	during	the	uprisings	themselves.	They
invoked	bread,	dignity,	and	freedom,	and	above	all	performed	and	embodied	the	unity	of	a	rights-bearing	and	sovereign
people. 	Many	activists	were	relatively	newly	minted.	There	was	no	strong	organizational	core:	activism	was	more
decentralized.	Only	in	Egypt	did	strike	action	approach	the	scale	of	what	took	place	in	Iran. 	There	was	no	clear
ideological	program	for	transformation:	doctrinalism	was	viewed	as	problematic	in	many	activist	sectors.	The	Arab
uprisings	did	not	push	through	sweeping	revolutionary	change	(with	the	partial	exception	of	Tunisia),	and	their	initial
leaderships,	insofar	as	they	existed,	nowhere	took	power	(with	the	partial	exception	of	the	Muslim	Brotherhood	in
Egypt).	Neither	Tunisia	nor	Egypt	attempted	to	export	the	revolution,	and	neither	country	was	invaded	by	a	foreign
power,	both	important	features	of	the	revolutions	of	1789	(in	France),	1917	(in	Russia),	and	1978–79	(in	Iran).	These
differences	from	the	Iranian	case	caution	against	straightforward	analogies.
The	uprisings	are	also	distinctive	in	a	longer,	post-1914	regional	perspective.	Most	of	the	major	uprisings	during	the
period	from	the	First	World	War	to	the	1960s	were	undertaken	against	colonial	rule	or	against	local	rulers	who	were
perceived	as	and	often	were	colonial	proxies.	Armed	struggles	of	national	liberation,	such	as	in	Algeria	(1954–1962),
South	Yemen	(1963–1967),	Oman	(1965–1975),	and	among	the	Palestinians	(1964–1982),	along	with	revolutionary	coups
d’état	(Egypt	1952,	Iraq	1958,	North	Yemen	1962,	Libya	1969),	not	to	mention	the	rounds	of	armed	struggle	from
Morocco	to	Iraq	that	followed	the	First	World	War,	are	hard	to	compare	directly	with	2011. 	They	were	armed,
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nationalist,	opposed	to	colonialism,	and	were	marked	by	liberalism	in	the	1920s	and	socialism	in	the	1950s	and	1960s,	and
were	often	thick	in	organization	and	leadership.
Alternatively,	the	Cairo	fire	of	January	1952	is	suggestive	because	it	involved	a	major,	largely	spontaneous	rising	without
any	clear	leadership	or	program	that	quickly	subsided	and	paved	the	way	for	the	military	intervention	of	July	1952. 	But	it
targeted	with	fire	the	symbols	of	the	colonial	order	and	its	domestic	allies	in	a	highly	charged	nationalist	context	and	was
not	a	statewide	uprising,	but	limited	to	downtown	Cairo.	The	intervention	of	the	Free	Officers	in	1952,	furthermore,	was
insurrectionary	and	unpredictable,	entirely	different	to	the	recent	more	widely	predicted	political	role	of	the	Supreme
Council	of	the	Armed	Forces	or	of	General	el-Sisi. 	Egypt’s	insurrection	of	1919	was	thoroughly	mass-based,	unarmed,
and	engaged	the	liberal	middle	classes.	But	it	involved	the	peasantry	on	a	broader	scale	than	the	rising	of	2011	and	was
directed	above	all	against	colonial	rule,	not	a	domestic	ruler.	One	of	the	striking	features	of	the	Arab	uprisings	is	that	they
did	far	less	than	almost	any	mass	uprising	since	1914	to	define	their	local	rulers	as	lackeys	of	the	West.	The	Arab
uprisings	were	very	much	focused	on	the	tyranny,	kleptocracy,	corruption,	and	incompetence	of	the	local	regimes.	This
was,	indeed,	in	contrast	with	Iran	1978–79,	where	neocolonialist	theses	were	recast	in	Islamist	clothes:	the	US	was
depicted	as	the	Great	Satan	and	Khomeini	declared	that	the	rulers	of	the	world,	which	included	the	Pahlavi	Shah,	were
America’s	serfs.
The	importance	of	the	attitude	the	region’s	militaries	took	up	to	political	incumbents	has	been	made	increasingly	clear.
Some	defected,	some	stayed	neutral,	others	maintained	their	loyalty	to	incumbents.	It	was,	nonetheless,	the	mass
uprising	that	provided	the	dynamic	context	which	set	other	actors,	powerful	and	not	so	powerful,	into	motion.	Military
intervention	in	politics	in	Egypt	(since	1952)	and	in	Turkey	(since	at	least	1913),	is	no	surprise	in	historical	context.	The
back	seat	taken	by	the	military	in	Tunisia,	conversely,	was	to	be	expected	given	the	military’s	highly	limited	role	in	political
society	there.	By	the	same	token,	Syria’s	military	could	be	expected	to	continue	to	follow	orders,	since	this	was	a
continuation	of	the	pattern	established	in	the	massive	suppression	of	the	Hama	rising	of	1982,	and	nothing	new.	The
major	surprise,	on	the	other	hand,	and	what	no	one	had	predicted	except	in	vague	terms,	was	the	mass	uprising.	If	it
became	in	the	interests	of	the	military	in	Tunisia	and	Egypt	to	detach	their	fates	from	those	of	the	political	incumbents,
the	decisive	factor	that	made	this	new	calculus	of	interest	possible	was	the	uprising.
Nineteenth-century	Comparisons
Comparisons	with	protests	and	uprisings	in	the	nineteenth	century	should	not	be	dismissed.	Before	1914,	the
constitutional	movements	in	Khedivial	Egypt	(1881–82),	Qajar	Iran	(1905–11),	and	the	Ottoman	Empire	(1908)	wrought
major	political	concessions	from	domestic	governments,	and	sometimes	drew	in	foreign	invasion	or	intervention.	They
were	led	in	large	measure	by	urban	liberals	and	sometimes	patriots,	and	targeted	the	rulers	of	local	states.	But	patriotism
meant	something	different	(and	new)	in	states	that	were	actually	empires	or	parts	of	empires,	and	these	movements
were	less	evidently	mass	popular	uprisings.	In	Egypt,	the	‘Urabi	movement,	albeit	making	popular	appeals,	was	led	by
officers,	provincial	notables,	and	merchants	maneuvering	for	power	within	the	state,	not	by	peasants,	artisans,	or
townspeople.	The	latter,	when	they	did	rise	after	the	first	British	invasion	in	June	1882,	did	so	for	different	reasons,	under
different	banners,	and	not	in	ways	that	were	coordinated	with	the	‘Urabiyyin. 	In	Qajar	Iran	during	1905–11,	peasants	and
urban	townspeople	were	outside	and	quickly	became	disaffected	with	the	core	alliance	of	liberals,	bazaar,	and	clergy,
champions	of	the	new	parliament. 	In	Istanbul	in	1908,	the	constitutional	movement	was	led	by	an	alliance	of	elitist,
antireligious	liberals	and	military ;	the	most	popular	uprising	of	the	period	was	in	fact	in	the	name	of	Islam	in	1909
against	the	Young	Turks	and	their	military	methods.
Risings	involving	commoners	(al-‘amma,	al-ra‘iya)	and	defecting	elites	(al-khassa,	al-‘askeri),	and	notables	(a‘yan)	in	the
eighteenth	and	nineteenth	centuries	against	Ottoman,	Ottoman–Egyptian,	Moroccan,	and	local	rule	on	occasion	unseated
sultans	or	local	potentates,	and	in	some	cases	had	a	mass	character.	In	1703,	an	uprising	against	the	new	lifetime	tax
farms	deposed	the	Ottoman	Sultan	Mustafa	II	(r.	1695–1703)	and	put	Ahmed	III	(r.	1703–1730)	on	the	throne.	The
uprising	of	Patrona	Halil	in	1730	deposed	Ahmed	III	and	replaced	him	with	Mahmut	I	(1730–1754). 	In	Izmir	in	1788,
urban	artisans,	guilds,	and	townspeople	rose	against	the	tripling	of	taxes	stemming	from	the	outbreak	of	war	in	1787,
ousting	a	number	of	important	officials	and	local	notables. 	Ottoman	Sultan	Selim	III	(r.	1789–1807)	was	unseated	in
May	1807	and	replaced	as	a	result	of	mass	protests	of	Janissaries,	‘ulama,	and	townspeople	against	his	new	conscript
army. 	There	were	commoner	uprisings	in	Moroccan	towns	against	merchants	and	heavy	taxes	on	several	occasions
(e.g.	1818	and	1873	in	Fez,	and	in	1844	in	Rabat). 	In	Morocco,	notables	and	commoners	were	involved	in	the	risings	of
‘Abd	al-Hafiz	(1875–1937),	which	brought	this	pretender	to	the	sultanate	in	1908,	and	of	Ahmad	al-Hiba	(1876–1919),
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whose	revolutionary	heterodoxies	briefly	held	sway	in	Marrakesh	after	the	sultan	had	signed	Morocco	over	to	the	French
Protectorate	in	1912. 	Commoner	uprisings,	by	turns	against	taxation	and	feudalism,	were	something	of	a	tradition	on
Mount	Lebanon:	there	were	risings,	for	example,	in	1790,	1821,	1840,	and	most	famously	in	1858–1860,	when	the
Christian	muleteer	Tanyus	Shahin	evicted	the	Khazin	notables	in	an	initially	nonviolent	way	in	the	name	of	a	radically
egalitarian	interpretation	of	the	tanzimat	(1839–1876). 	Commoner	risings	proclaiming	loyalty	to	the	sultan	but	seeking
redress	in	matters	of	taxation	and	local	exploitation,	and	laying	claim	to	the	promises	of	the	tanzimat	were	relatively
common	in	the	Balkans	during	the	nineteenth	century. 	Finally,	millenarian	uprisings,	sometimes	with	a	mass	base,
against	taxes,	economic	exploitation,	urban	orthodoxy,	and	corrupt	Muslim	rulers	studded	the	history	of	the	Nile	Valley
during	the	nineteenth	century. 	The	Mahdiyya	of	1881–1885,	which	created	a	state	on	the	Upper	Nile	almost	the	size	of
Egypt,	was	only	the	most	successful	of	these	uprisings	against	Ottoman–Egyptian	rule	and	Islamic	orthodoxy.
Pre-1914	uprisings	and	their	lessons	regarding	reform,	authoritarianism,	sectarian	violence,	and	imperial	intervention	are
instructive	for	the	present.	Strongmen	have	come	to	power	after	popular	protest	before.	In	Egypt	in	1805,	commoner
protest	played	an	important	role	in	forcing	out	the	existing	governor	and	championing	the	accession	to	power	of	the
warlord	and	dynasty-builder	Muhammad	Ali	Pasha	(r.	1805–1849),	who	certainly	brought	law	and	order,	but	also
massacred	opponents,	coerced	a	conscript	army	into	existence,	and	massively	increased	the	tax	burden. 	Here	was	a
faint	echo	of	the	Egyptian	events	of	June–July	2013,	when	a	partly	pro-army	popular	uprising	(June	30,	2013)	paved	the
way	for	a	military	coup	(July	3,	2013),	whose	leaderships	went	on	to	re-establish	the	security	state	through	massacre	and
repression.	Tanyus	Shahin’s	(1815–1895)	egalitarian	uprising	in	the	historic	Bilad	al-Sham	(present-day	Syria,	Jordan,
Lebanon,	and	Israel/Palestine)	wound	up	in	sectarianism	and	violence	because	it	was	unable	to	prevent	a	confrontation
between	Christian	and	Druze	in	the	mixed	districts	of	Mount	Lebanon	and	the	Shuf. 	Activists	in	Syria	since	2011	have
certainly	faced	the	acute	problems	posed	by	the	politics	of	sectarianism	and	the	drift	towards	violence	in	2011–12.
Present-day	external	powers	have	seized	on	the	opportunities	presented	by	uprisings	to	intervene	militarily	just	as	they
did	in	the	nineteenth	century.	On	the	other	hand,	the	commoner	rising	of	1889	in	Jabal	Druze	in	Bilad	al-Sham	won	real
and	lasting	economic	and	political	concessions.
These	examples,	albeit	drawn	from	a	very	different	historical	context	to	the	present,	suggest	more	generally	that	mass
uprisings	against	domestic	(rather	than	colonial)	tyranny,	variously	under	the	banners	of	religion,	justice,	rights,	custom,
and	local	autonomy,	are	not	alien	to	the	modern	history	of	the	region,	as	more	contemporary-focused	views	have
suggested.	Historically,	nationalism	has	not	been	the	only	basis	for	regional	mass	mobilization.	This	historical	perspective
cautions	against	the	exceptionalist	view	in	which	the	Arab	uprisings	are	seen	as	something	fundamentally	new,	contrary	in
some	sense	to	the	constituted	nature	of	the	region,	whatever	that	would	be,	and	therefore	owing	something	decisive	to
external	influence,	conspiracy,	extraordinary	innovation,	or	revolutionary	awakening.	The	capacities	of	the	peoples	of	the
region	to	mount	forceful	and	even	revolutionary	challenges	to	established	authorities	has	a	long	history	and	should	not	be
treated	as	a	fundamental	rupture	with	the	past,	however	surprising	the	events	of	2011.	The	perspective	underlines,
finally,	the	existence	of	long-term	shifts	in	the	targets	of	protest	that	seem	to	respond	to	historical	and	sociopolitical
contexts.	These	targets	included	domestic	rulers	before	1914,	colonialism	and	neocolonialism	from	the	First	World	War
until	the	1960s	and	1970s,	and	a	return	to	an	emphasis	on	domestic	regimes	since	the	1970s	(global	jihad	and	resistance
against	Israeli	colonization	and	warmongering	aside).
Protests	Targeting	Regimes	Since	the	1970s
The	military	firmly	established	itself	in	Arab	state	politics	after	independence.	Democratic	participation,	independent
organizing,	and	civil	liberties	were	curtailed	or	excluded	on	the	basis	that	rule	by	patriotic	Free	Officers	or	strongmen	of
civilian	origin	would	bring	economic	growth,	redistribution,	social	mobility,	and	social	reform.	This	archetypal,
antidemocratic	“social	pact”	was	established	in	Egypt	in	1952	and	played	an	important	role	in	various	ways	in	Tunisia	after
1955,	Iraq	after	1958,	Syria	after	1963,	Algeria	after	1965,	Yemen	after	1967,	and	Libya	after	1969.	It	was	burnished	as	a
form	of	cultural	hegemony	by	recourse	to	pan-Arabism	and	strong	forms	of	nationalism	and	sometimes	Third	Worldism	on
the	regional	and	international	stage.
Absolutism	in	independent	Saudi	Arabia	was	established	and	maintained	through	the	Leftist	and	pan-Arab	challenges	of
the	1950s	and	1960s	in	part	because	of	elite	arrangements	within	the	dominant	bloc,	but	also	with	regard	to	the
subaltern	population,	rentier	provisionism,	segmentation	via	the	import	and	sharp	exclusion	of	working	and	productive
classes,	and	by	the	cultivation	of	an	absolutist	version	of	Salafi-Wahhabism	that	preached	a	sectarian	antipolitics	that	left
political	decisions	to	the	waliyy	al-amr	(the	ruler)	to	whom	obedience	was	required.	In	most	of	the	other	Gulf	states,
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post-independence	consent	in	an	authoritarian	context	was	won	by	rentierism,	migration	segmentation	and	exclusion,	and
the	cultivation	of	the	image	of	rulers	who	cherished	and	promoted	Arab	values.
It	is	preponderantly	in	the	formerly	“revolutionary	republics”	that	the	post-independence	form	of	hegemony	has	seriously
unraveled,	and	therefore	the	basis	for	post-independence	antidemocratic	rule	has	been	fundamentally	eroded.	Their
social	pacts	were	increasingly	violated	from	the	1970s	onwards,	when	indicators	on	real	economic	growth,	redistribution,
social	mobility,	and	social	reform	ceased	to	improve	or	went	into	reverse.	While	crony	capitalism	meant	spoils	for	a
narrow	dominant	bloc,	hegemony	on	a	wider	scale	was	never	reformulated	on	new	bases,	as	promises	over	new	forms
of	prosperity	and	democracy	always	rang	hollow	for	the	mass	of	the	subaltern	population.	Credentials	in	pan-Arabism	and
nationalism	were	not	replaced	with	alternative	forms	of	cultural	hegemony.	Among	the	nonrevolutionary	republics,
Bahrain’s	rentier	provisionism	has	become	less	significant	over	time	with	the	reduction	in	oil	production.	It	is	partially
explicable,	therefore,	that	as	these	forms	of	consent	were	thinned	out,	and	as	the	promised	provisions	of	dictatorship
became	increasingly	threadbare	from	the	late	1960s	onwards,	that	protests	against	domestic,	post-independence
regimes	became	increasingly	frequent.
Uprisings	Since	1977
In	the	1970s,	the	tradition	of	popular	uprising,	when	diverse	masses	of	ordinary	people	poured	onto	the	streets	in	ways
that	were	not	immediately	under	the	control	of	any	one	leadership,	frequently	in	anti-imperial	clothes	during	the	colonial
period,	was	taken	up	anew	in	the	region,	this	time	targeting	the	domestic	regime.	The	intifada	of	January	18–19,	1977,	in
Egypt,	was	a	popular	uprising,	the	most	dramatic	mass	action	since	the	Cairo	fire	of	January	1952.	In	accordance	with
IMF	structural	adjustment	prescriptions,	Sadat’s	government	announced	on	January	17	a	50%	cut	in	subsidies	for	basic
consumer	goods,	implying	steep	rises	in	the	price	of	bread,	sugar,	tea,	and	bottled	gas,	and	important	rises	in	the	price
of	rice,	cooking	oil,	macaroni,	gasoline,	and	cigarettes.	In	the	capital,	protestors,	led	initially	by	industrial	workers,
increasingly	filled	the	streets	and	violent	confrontations	with	security	forces	developed.	Downtown	Cairo	was	largely	in	the
hands	of	the	demonstrators	for	two	days.	Considerable	damage	was	done	to	regime	institutions	and	commercial	private
property	owned	by	Sadat’s	nouveau-riche.	There	were	significant	protests	in	Alexandria	and	elsewhere.	To	judge	by	their
slogans,	the	demonstrators	saw	themselves	as	the	people,	as	workers,	students,	and	peasants,	suffering	from	poverty
and	hunger,	pitted	against	corrupt	and	tyrannical	authorities,	corrupt,	wealthy,	exploitative,	and	even	decadent	elites,	and
the	dangers	of	capitalism.
Broadly	comparable,	pioneering	waves	of	protest	against	post-independence	regimes	and	their	new	forms	of	crony
capitalism	took	place	elsewhere	in	the	region.	There	was	a	wave	of	strikes	in	Tunisia	in	1977	in	which	the	country’s	major
union	federation,	the	Union	Générale	Tunisienne	du	Travail	(UGTT),	played	an	important	role.	These	culminated	in	a
general	strike	in	1978.	There	were	major	street	protests	against	price	hikes	for	basic	commodities	in	Morocco	in	1981
and	in	both	Morocco	and	Tunisia	in	1984,	when	such	protests	were	able	to	win	socioeconomic	concessions	in	many
cases	and	slow	the	course	of	neoliberal	advance. 	On	October	5,	1988,	thousands	of	youths,	mostly	male	secondary-
school	students	and	unemployed,	ransacked	central	Algiers.	Over	the	following	two	days,	the	movement	spread	across
the	country,	drawing	in	broader	constituencies	and	Islamist	organizations,	and	bringing	military	repression	from	the
government.	While	major	protests	had	taken	place	in	the	name	of	the	Amazigh/Berbers	in	1980,	the	protests	of	1988
were	more	widespread,	drew	in	a	wider	cross	section	of	the	public.	They	involved	an	array	of	economic	and	political
motivations	and	demands. 	In	Bahrain,	a	broad-based	uprising	seeking	political	concessions	(above	all	the	reinstatement
of	the	National	Assembly)	from	the	Sunni	sectarian	monarchy	continued	from	1994	to	1998–99.	Widespread	protests
took	place	in	the	wake	of	the	“stolen	election”	in	Iran	in	2009.
This	history	gives	the	lie	to	those	who	professed	astonishment	that	the	uprisings	of	2011	were	not	hegemonized	by
Islamism:	none	of	the	above-mentioned	mass	protests	were	led	or	initiated	by	Islamists	or	their	demands,	slogans,	and
networks.	In	Algeria	in	1988,	for	example,	Islamists	joined	after	the	urban	poor	had	started	the	action.	The	two-day
uprising	in	Egypt	in	1977	does	not	seem	to	have	had	any	specifically	Islamist	content.	Indeed,	the	strategy	of	the	Egyptian
Muslim	Brotherhood	never	included	a	mass	uprising:	the	stage	of	“execution,”	insofar	as	it	was	pursued	(largely	before
1952),	was	a	poorly	defined	armed	struggle,	but	not	an	insurrection	of	the	masses.	The	Muslim	Brotherhood	in	Syria
called	for	a	mass	uprising	in	1982,	but	in	practice	their	antiregime	jihad	involved	organized	cadres	undertaking	armed
attacks	on	regime	targets	and	insurrectionary	protest	in	1982	was	limited	to	Hama. 	If	we	broaden	the	focus	we	note
that	in	both	the	first	Palestinian	intifada	of	1987–91,	and	the	uprising	in	Lebanon	in	2005,	the	more	spontaneous	aspects
of	these	protests	were	not	organized	by	Islamists	and	did	not	express	Islamist	slogans.	Only	in	Iran	in	1978–79	did
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Islamists	stand	at	the	head	of	a	mass	uprising,	quite	likely	because	politicized	Shi	‘ism	not	only	had	a	republican	and
democratic	component,	but	also	because	it	was	far	more	explicit	than	many	strands	of	Sunni	modernism,	let	alone	Salafi-
Wahhabism,	on	socioeconomic	questions	and	the	problems	of	the	dispossessed.	Indeed,	it	was	not	just	a	strategic
decision,	fear	of	the	American	“veto”	that	kept	Islamist	banners	at	home	during	the	Egyptian	uprising	of	2011;	it	was	also
that	Islamist	framing	was	not	capable	of	uniting	the	protestors.
Democratic	Genealogies
These	observations	suggest	a	popular	democratic	genealogy	to	the	uprisings	of	2011	that	has	been	under-researched.
Amid	the	thinning	political	hegemony	of	the	post-independence	regimes,	some	sought	to	reconstitute	the	original	social
pact,	looking	back	to	Nasserism	and	Baathism.	Others	believed,	in	revolutionary	or	reformist	modes,	that	Islam	was	the
solution,	and	that	the	secular	state	had	usurped	the	true	destiny	of	the	region.	Less	emphasized	is	that	others	looked	for
answers	and	solutions	in	democratic	forms	of	socialism	or	Islamism,	or	participatory	and	even	radically	democratic	forms
of	politics.
Influenced	by	the	rejection	of	official	communism	in	1960s	France,	a	significant	group	of	Lebanese	intellectuals	and
activists	developed	an	interest	in	democratic	forms	of	socialism	in	the	1960s	and	early	1970s.	They	elaborated	a	Leftist
critique	of	the	Arab	world’s	military	and	“progressive”	regimes	and	were	active	in	a	number	of	organizations,	including
ones	such	as	Socialist	Lebanon	(1964–70). 	The	socialism	of	the	Lebanese	National	Movement	in	the	mid-1970s	was
sharply	critical	of	the	military	regimes,	and	Maoist	currents	aside,	had	democratic,	decentralized,	and	even	anarchic
features. 	In	Egypt,	important	intellectuals	such	as	Anwar	Abd	al-Malik	criticized	Egypt’s	“military	society”	as	early	as
1962	for	failing	to	bring	about	popular	democracy. 	Democratic	demands	were	at	work	in	Egypt	in	the	slogans	of	1977,
one	of	which	ran	as	follows:
The	first	demand,	young	men,	is	the	right	to	a	multi-party	system	/	The	second	demand,	you	masses,	is	the	right
to	publication	and	expression	/	The	third	demand,	oh	free	people,	is	fixed	prices	(Awwal	matlab	ya	shabab,	haqq
ta’addud	al-ahzab	/	Tani	matlab	ya	jamahir,	haqq	al-nashr	wa-l-ta’bir	/	Talit	matlab	ya	ahrar,	rabt	al-ajr	bi-l-
as’ar).
Sunni	modernist	Islamism	may	not	have	been	as	precise	as	politicized	Shi’ism	on	the	place	of	republican	politics.
However,	unlike	Salafi-Wahhabism	it	never	decisively	rejected	party	politics,	elections,	parliaments,	and	constitutions,
whether	in	theory	or	in	practice.	This	was	demonstrated	by	the	democratic	mobilization	of	the	FIS	in	Algeria	between
1989	and	1992,	as	well	as	other	cases	in	Egypt,	Jordan,	and	Yemen. 	The	reform	movement	in	Iran	from	the	early	1990s
onwards	pushed	a	more	democratic	and	women’s	rights-oriented	interpretation	of	Shi’a	Islam.
Liberal,	democratic,	and	sometime	secular	themes	were	taken	up	in	the	first	Palestinian	intifada,	the	Bahrain	uprising	in
the	1990s,	the	short-lived	Damascus	“spring”	of	2000–2001,	the	Boycott,	Divestment	Sanctions	(BDS)	movement	for
Palestinian	rights	after	2004,	the	independence	intifada	in	Lebanon	in	2005,	and	in	the	return	of	liberal	and	labor	protest
in	Egypt	in	the	2000s,	including	the	Kifaya	movement,	opposing	dynastic	succession	in	Egypt	in	2005.	Such	themes	were
also	at	work	in	the	labor	protests	in	Gafsa	in	Tunisia	in	2008,	among	Anarchists	against	the	Wall	in	Israel/Palestine,	and
among	militant	bloggers	using	social	media	to	denounce	human-rights	abuses	in	various	parts	of	the	region	from	at	least
2008	onwards. 	In	particular,	a	new	generation	of	“liberal	youth”	emerged	on	the	regional	scene	after	the	2000s.	While
downplaying	the	language	of	socialism,	these	groups	increasingly	spoke	in	the	languages	of	human	rights	and	individual
freedom,	and	sometimes	found	progressive	inspiration	in	themes	of	radical	and	participatory	democracy.	They	targeted
the	abuse,	tyranny,	and	corruption	of	the	crony	capitalist	regimes	in	place,	and	made	much	use	of	new	media	to
communicate	and	publicize	their	views.	In	Tunisia	and	Egypt,	languages	of	social	and	economic	rights	were	elaborated
anew	by	a	labor	movement	re-energized	to	protect	itself	against	privatization,	cutbacks,	and	corruption,	and	workers	in
their	millions,	especially	in	Egypt,	became	practiced	in	strike	action	and	protest.	These	democratic	forms	of	activism,
alongside	new	assertions	of	social	and	economic	rights,	played	an	important	role	in	the	background	to	the	Arab	uprisings
and	their	leading	slogans	of	bread,	dignity,	and	freedom.
Crowd	Unity	and	Participatory	Democracy
The	unity	of	the	crowds	in	Tunisia,	Egypt,	and	beyond	in	2011	was	not	just	a	matter	of	“surging	alongside	one	another”	by
diverse	groups	with	entirely	different	interests	and	concerns:	if	so,	how	could	the	popular	unity	that	the	uprisings
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exhibited	have	been	constituted?	Nor	was	it	simply	a	matter	of	a	liminal	and	fleeting	experience	of	communitas,	although
this	was	undoubtedly	part	of	the	picture.	Nor	clearly,	was	this	unity	pre-given	or	constituted	on	the	spot	by	a	vanguard
that	stepped	up	to	hegemonize	the	crowd,	as	the	Islamists	in	Algeria	had	done	to	some	extent	in	1988–89.	This	was	so
for	the	simple	reason	that	no	such	vanguard	or	leadership	existed	in	2011,	whether	among	workers,	Islamists,	or
revolutionary	youth.	These	different	groups	and	their	organizations,	in	Egypt	at	least,	took	their	place	alongside	urban
poor,	women,	Copts,	public-sector	workers,	and	others	within	a	broader,	informal	revolutionary	coalition	capable	of
expressing	coherent	demands	and	demonstrating	considerable	powers	of	solidarity.	New	media	and	the	Internet	cannot
explain	this	unity;	a	historical	perspective	shows	that	major	protests	always	make	use	of	the	communication	technologies
at	hand.	This	has	been	so	throughout	the	history	of	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	(MENA),	from	rumor	in	nineteenth-
century	Algeria,	to	radio	in	the	1950s	and	1960s,	to	cassette-tapes	in	the	1970s. 	Protestors	and	their	opponents	make
use	of	these	technologies,	and	technology	can	be	used	in	ways	that	are	divisive.	In	other	words,	if	we	are	to	eschew
technological	determinism,	we	need	to	understand	how	popular	unity	was	achieved	among	millions	of	protestors,	a	rare
achievement	by	historical	standards,	even	if	briefly,	in	certain	parts	of	the	Arab	world	in	2011.
The	democratic	genealogy	sketched	here	may	serve	to	explain	in	part	how	this	unity	was	possible.	Various	segments	of
the	liberal	youth	had	made	attempts	to	eschew	doctrine,	hierarchy,	and	ideological	division	in	the	years	preceding	the
uprisings.	They	had	also	made	use	of	networked,	leaderless,	and	“leaderful”	forms	of	organizing,	forms	of	coordination
that	are	open	to	new	adherents,	and	which	do	not	police	their	own	boundaries	with	expulsions,	membership	cards	and
dues,	or	doctrinal	tests.	Liberal	youth	had	rejected	the	idea	of	the	sole	leader,	a	form	which	would	almost	certainly	have
acted	to	divide	rather	than	unite	the	mass	of	the	population	in	the	context	of	2011.
This	participatory	democratic	style	had	considerable	potential	as	a	basis	of	unity,	at	least	if	we	consider	Egypt	as	a	case
study.	It	formed	an	important	basis	for	the	links	and	alliances	that	were	forged	between	liberals	and	Muslim	Brotherhood
youth,	insofar	as	such	links	relied	absolutely	on	the	readiness	of	protagonists	to	set	aside	organizational	and	doctrinal
differences.	Less	noted	is	the	significance	of	the	fact	that	the	labor	movement,	informally	and	locally	organized,	was	highly
suspicious	of	urban	leaderships,	formal	organizations,	and	ideologues.	It	was	far	more	likely	that	under	these
circumstances,	the	labor	movement	would	join	forces	with	groups	that	did	not	proclaim	that	they	knew	in	advance	what
were	the	true	economic	and	political	interests	of	workers.	The	respectable,	apolitical,	and	patriotic	middle	classes	in
Egypt,	furthermore,	were	far	more	likely	to	be	inspired	by	Wael	Ghonim’s	lowest-common-denominator	style	of	framing,
his	eschewal	of	“politics”	and	“ideology,”	and	his	positioning	as	a	“good	son	of	Egypt,”	than	by	more	openly	“political”
currents. 	Likewise,	the	urban	poor,	scraping	together	livelihoods,	sometimes	in	confrontation	with	elements	of	the
“shattered	state,”	and	developing	their	own	informal	networks	and	rules	and	codes	of	action,	had	undermined	the
ideological	hegemony	of	the	state. 	They	were	hardly	likely	to	be	drawn	to	wealthy	secular	activists	proclaiming	a	new
program,	leadership,	and	organization	that	would	transform	state	and	society	in	some	systemic	way.	Quite	apart	from	the
class	issues	at	stake,	the	poor	knew	above	all	else	that	there	was	no	such	formal	and	functioning	system	to	be
transformed;	formal	rules	and	actual	practice	were	so	far	apart	as	to	make	society	seem	as	if	it	was	“structured	as	a
joke.” 	When	the	liberals	targeted	the	human-rights	abuses	of	the	ubiquitous	and	intrusive	police,	however,	this	was,
indeed,	a	language	that	the	poor	could	understand.	While	uprisings	are	often	networked,	decentralized,	and	partially
leaderless,	some	sectors	of	the	liberal	youth	in	the	Arab	uprisings	made	a	virtue	of	this	horizontalist	organizational
structure,	an	important	participatory	democratic	background	that	made	possible	alliances	between	diverse	and	usually
mutually	divided	groups.	For	this	reason,	horizontalism	was	more	important	than	its	relatively	thin	sociology	might
suggest.
The	People	Demand!
The	historical	perspective,	nonetheless,	has	an	almost	built-in	tendency	towards	determinism.	A	complete	historical
explanation	often	leaves	no	room	for	creativity—understood	in	terms	of	the	arrival	of	a	new	collective	actor,	or	the	rapid
rise	to	potency	of	a	previously	fragile	and	inchoate	collective	actor—as	everything	is	explained	in	terms	of	antecedents	or
accidents.	Historians	may	be	able	to	identify	the	change	in	“continuity	and	change,”	but	they	often	end	up	explaining	it
away,	either	by	recourse	to	contingency,	or	by	reference	to	the	overweaning	capacities	of	an	existing	powerful	actor
(individual	or	collective),	or	with	reference	to	a	grand	overarching	process—modernization,	capitalist	development,	or
globalization.	One	of	the	most	important	forms	of	creativity	to	emerge	from	the	Arab	uprisings,	however,	was	the	on-the-
spot	and	unpredetermined	constitution	of	the	people	as	a	rights-bearing,	activist,	diverse,	demanding,	and	sovereign
subject.	This	constitution	was	perhaps	best	encapsulated	when	the	well-worn	poetry	of	the	Tunisian	national	anthem	was
infused	with	new	meaning:
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If,	one	day,	a	people	desires	to	live	/	Then	fate	will	answer	their	call	/	Darkness	must	dissipate	/	And	must	the
chain	give	way.
The	idea	of	popular	sovereignty	had	been	established	in	the	region	in	the	age	of	anticolonial	nationalism,	but	the	idea	that
a	rights-bearing	people	in	a	post-independence	context	could	en	masse	realistically	demand	and	bring	about	the	fall	of
the	local,	national	regime	was	something	new.	Revolutionary	calls	have	indeed	been	largely	monopolized	by	Islamists	or
socialists,	in	different	registers,	in	recent	decades.	What	is	so	striking	is	that	no	particular	segment,	individual,	or
organization	devised	this	revolutionary	call	in	advance.	The	slogan	“the	people	demand	to	bring	down	the	regime”	(al-
sha’b	yurid	isqat	al-nizam)	originated	in	Tunisia	in	the	heat	of	the	action;	its	status	became	so	iconic	that	not	even
Egyptians	translated	it	into	their	own	colloquial.	In	this	phrase,	the	people	did	not	only	demand,	but	implied	through	the
transitive	verb	“asqata”	that	it	was	they	who	would	undertake	the	action	and	actually	overthrow	the	regime	themselves.
This	idea	was	unthinkable,	laughable	even,	the	preserve	of	cranks	and	idealists,	only	weeks	before.	It	is	hard,	therefore,
to	resist	the	notion	that	this	leading	idea	emerged	from	the	struggle	itself,	and	did	not	precede	it.
To	grasp	this,	it	may	be	helpful	to	consider	how	new	connections	between	previously	unconnected	but	subordinated
constituencies	can	give	rise	to	new	feelings	of	empowerment,	the	collapse	of	the	“wall	of	fear,”	and	new	forms	of
collective	solidarity	capable	of	authorizing	themselves	and	bringing	into	being	demands	and	collective	agencies	that	did
not	previously	exist	or	were	fragile	or	protean.	In	the	Arab	uprisings,	such	new	solidarities	and	demands	marched
together	with	the	new	strategies	and	tactics	that	also	emerged	in	the	heat	of	the	action.	These	moves	included	the
continuous	occupation	of	major	public	squares,	so	central	to	the	theater	of	the	regime’s	repressive	power,	the	swarming
tactics	that	enabled	demonstrators	to	access	the	squares	in	the	first	place	(by	gathering	first	in	back	streets,	and
drumming	up	support	there),	and	the	pitched	battles	with	police	that	astonishingly	degraded	the	capacity	of	the	security
forces	to	repress	crowds	and	discharge	their	more	quotidian	functions. 	These	forms	of	organization,	strategies,	and
tactics	performed	the	unity	of	the	people,	and	the	people’s	unity	stood	on	the	effectiveness	of	these	repertoires.
People	Power
The	foregoing	suggests	that	the	Arab	uprisings	can	be	compared	broadly	to	people-power	uprisings,	characterized	by
two	keen	observers	as	relatively	nonviolent	demonstrations	in	which	hundreds	of	thousands	simply	showed	their	disgust,
lack	of	fear,	and	unwillingness	to	cooperate	with	the	old	regime	in	massive	demonstrations	in	urban	public	spaces.
Such	nonviolent	uprisings	do	not	involve	disciplined	hierarchical	organization	and	armed	struggle;	nor	do	they	necessarily
propose	through	any	determined	revolutionary	leadership	an	alternative	ideological	blueprint	for	state	and	society.
Independent	or	nominally	independent	nation-states	have	witnessed	such	uprisings	since	the	1980s.	One	such	case	was
the	Philippines	in	1986,	and	there	were	a	number	of	lesser-known	cases	in	southeast	Asia	from	the	1980s	to	the
2000s. 	Eastern	Europe	during	1989–90	furnished	a	number	of	cognate	examples.	Finally,	there	were	“color
revolutions”	in	former	Soviet	republics	in	the	2000s.	In	this	perspective,	and	inspired	explicitly	and	implicitly	by	the	Arab
uprisings,	Occupy	movements	in	Spain,	Greece,	London,	New	York,	Iceland,	the	occupation	of	the	Maidan	in	Ukraine,
and	more	recently	protests	in	Turkey,	Brazil,	and	Hong	Kong,	have	also	exhibited	characteristics	of	people	power.
On	the	global	scene,	moreover,	movements	have	for	some	time	placed	weight	on	the	logics	of	participatory	democracy
and	horizontalism,	have	eschewed	vertical	hierarchies,	and	embraced	decentralization,	diversity,	and	networked
structures.	Since	1968,	these	movements	have	worked	in	progressive	circles	to	replace	and	rework	official,	doctrinal,
hierarchical,	and	statist	communism.	The	alter-globalization	and	social-justice	movement	has	made	much	of
“[p]refiguration,	horizontality,	diversity,	decentralisation	and	the	network	structure.” 	Occupy	movements	embraced
consensus-seeking	and	participatory	decision-making	processes	in	opposition	to	Left	doctrinalism	and	sectarianism. 	The
movement	of	landless	workers	in	Brazil	since	1984	eschewed	the	use	of	a	party	and	invoked	themes	of	decentralization,
non-hierarchy,	and	consensus;	piquetero	movements	of	the	unemployed	in	Argentina	emphasized	themes	of	autonomy
and	decentralization. 	The	term	“horizontalism”	(horizontalidad)	was	coined	in	Argentina	to	describe	the	movements
that	emerged	there	in	December	2001	after	the	economic	crisis.	This	activism	was	distinctive	in	its	rejection	of	a	political
program	and	its	attempts	to	create	directly	democratic	and	deliberative	spaces	and	new	social	relationships. 	The	global
spread	of	demonstrations	against	the	Iraq	War	of	2003	evoked	a	strong	mass	rejection	of	militarism,	neoliberalism,	and
racism	as	evinced	in	the	US–UK	decision	to	attack	Iraq	on	a	unilateral	and	illegal	basis	in	2003. 	In	some	respects,	these
demonstrations,	traveling	with	the	rising	sun	from	Australia	to	California,	by	way	of	Egypt	and	the	UK,	were	the
transnational	equivalent,	albeit	at	a	far	lower	level	of	institutional	disruption,	of	people-power	uprisings	in	different
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national	settings,	this	time	with	the	target	being	the	predatory	policies	of	the	United	States.	In	this	perspective,	the	Arab
uprisings	in	2011	are	in	some	ways	comparable	to	uprisings	and	participatory	democratic	forms	that	have	been	important
in	various	parts	of	the	world	in	recent	times.
Weaknesses	of	People	Power
The	Arab	uprisings	suggest,	however,	that	people	power	is	vulnerable	to	military	repression	and	even	more	to	the
segmentation	of	the	people.	“The	condition	of	the	success	of	…	‘people	power’	revolution”	write	McAdam	and	Sewell,
“is	that	the	regimes	in	power	be	unwilling	to	use	their	superior	military	force	in	putting	the	demonstrations	down.” 	In
Bahrain	and	Syria,	above	all,	where	military	force	was	used	extensively	against	the	crowds,	and	in	Egypt	and	Tunisia,
where	in	2011	it	was	not,	seem	to	confirm	the	importance	of	the	role	of	the	military	in	the	success	or	failure	of	this	kind
of	uprising.	In	Bahrain	and	Syria	existing	regimes	endure,	while	in	Egypt	and	Tunisia	transformation	was	much	more
farreaching,	even	if	Egypt	has	now	reconstituted,	if	in	unstable	and	violent	fashion,	a	security	state.	People	power,	unlike
guerrilla	warfare,	does	not	have	a	clear	strategy	for	forceful	victory	in	the	case	of	a	direct	confrontation	with	tanks	and
missiles.	The	region’s	recent	history	seems	to	confirm	the	same	point:	Baathist	regimes	in	Syria	and	Iraq	did	not	hesitate
to	crush	uprisings	from	the	1970s	to	the	1990s,	and	these	regimes	survived,	while	during	the	same	period	in	Iran,	the
shah	did	hesitate	to	unleash	the	full	weight	of	his	available	repressive	capacity	against	the	crowds	and	his	regime	fell.
We	should	note	that	military	decisions	to	use	force	are	by	no	means	innocent	of	geopolitical	factors.	In	the	face	of	a
people-power	uprising,	the	decision	to	repress	with	force	may	turn	in	part	on	external	backing.	In	Eastern	Europe	in
1989–90,	Soviet	leader	Gorbachev	made	clear	that	he	would	not	lend	military	support	to	the	Warsaw	Pact	regimes.
Likewise,	in	Lebanon	in	2005	the	Russians	did	not	give	Syria	the	green	light	to	engage	in	the	violent	repression	of	the
independence	intifada	in	Lebanon;	the	Syrians	withdrew.	In	Egypt	in	2011,	the	White	House	set	itself	against	a	military
bloodbath	and	the	army	defected.	In	Bahrain	in	2011,	the	military	intervention	of	Saudi	Arabia	was	decisive	in	crushing	the
crowds,	while	other	important	external	backers,	the	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom,	turned	a	blind	eye	or
continued	to	support	the	Bahraini	monarchy.	By	contrast,	in	Egypt	in	2013,	Saudi	Arabia,	Kuwait,	and	the	United	Arab
Emirates	(UAE)	offered	financial	and	diplomatic	support	for	a	military	take-over	in	Egypt	and	the	ousting	of	the	Muslim
Brotherhood	there.	The	Brotherhood’s	occupation	of	Rab’a	and	al-Nahda	squares	then	proved	unable	to	protect	their
protagonists	from	massacre	at	the	hands	of	the	Egyptian	security	forces.
On	the	other	hand,	when	the	people	can	demonstrate	what	Tilly	called	WUNC	(worthiness,	unity,	numbers,	and
commitment), 	it	was	arguably	more	likely	that	militaries	would	vacillate	and	even	withdraw	their	support	from	political
incumbents.	Iran	offered	a	partial	case	of	this,	where	military	vacillation	may	have	been	linked	to	the	WUNC	of	the
crowds,	especially	because	the	shah	did	have	the	backing	of	the	United	States.	And	in	Syria	and	Iraq	in	the	1980s,
uprisings	linked	to	the	Muslim	Brotherhood,	to	region,	to	Shi’a,	or	to	Kurds	were	always	segmented	in	some	way,
relative	to	the	people	as	a	whole,	and	thus	failed	to	demonstrate	popular	unity.	Likewise	in	Bahrain	and	Syria,	protestors
were	vulnerable	to	the	charge	of	sectarianism,	and	in	Syria	in	particular,	certain	minorities	preferred	to	stick	with	the
strongman	they	knew,	fearing	the	Islamist	sectarianism	that	might	emerge	from	any	uprising.	In	Yemen	and	Libya,
popular	unity	was	always	harder	to	demonstrate,	and	results	were,	in	keeping	with	this,	more	ambiguous.	The	WUNC	of
“the	people”	in	Egypt	and	Tunisia,	on	the	other	hand,	together	with	the	unarmed	nature	of	the	action,	played	a	role	in
persuading	militaries	in	Egypt	and	Tunisia	to	recalculate	where	their	interests	lay,	and	to	vacillate	and	even	defect.	This
move	was	greatly	hastened	in	Egypt	by	the	great	popularity	which	the	army	demonstrably	enjoyed.	In	Tunisia,	France
continued	to	back	the	regime	until	a	very	late	stage.	Various	strands	of	Islamism,	it	should	be	noted,	above	all	those
drawn	from	Salafi-Wahhabism,	have	acutely	exacerbated	segmentation.	While	the	military	factor	is	vital,	along	with	the
position	adopted	by	external	backers,	we	should	not	lose	sight	of	the	fact	that	popular	unity	is	equally	significant	and
perhaps	even	more	important	to	the	overall	outcome.
Finally,	while	horizontalist	principles	were	important	in	enabling	the	unity	of	diverse	constituencies	amid	a	revolutionary
uprising,	they	were	less	effective	or	even	at	odds	with	the	exigencies	of	mobilization	within	political	society	when
opportunities	opened	up	in	electoral	processes	and	elsewhere	after	the	crowds	had	gone	home.	The	eschewal	of
organization,	leadership,	and	program,	in	a	situation	where	negotiators,	spokespersons,	policies,	representative
mechanisms,	and	organization	were	required	was	counterproductive.	Those	who	did	row	back	on	their	principles	in	order
to	become	engaged	in	this	kind	of	politics	could	be	seen	as	sellouts.	Those	who	did	not	“sell	out”	were	ineffective.	It	was
a	harsh	dilemma.	Those	adept	at	revolution	could	not	be	expected,	necessarily,	to	be	strong	in	electoral	games.	The	best
outcomes	in	Tunisia	were	quite	likely	related	to	the	way	that	strong	organizations	meshed	with	continued	crowd	actions
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capable	of	achieving	significant	institutional	disruption.	On	several	decisive	occasions,	derogation	from	popular	rights
were	confronted	and	defeated	by	this	kind	of	combination.
Conclusion
This	chapter	has	aimed	to	put	the	Arab	uprisings	of	2011	in	historical	perspective,	identifying	and	explaining	continuity
and	change	without	erasing	creativity.	It	has	been	argued	that	mass	uprisings	against	domestic	rules	and	regimes	have
been	seen	before	in	the	region,	albeit	in	a	very	different	historical	context,	under	prenationalist	banners	during	the
nineteenth	century.	More	recently,	contentious	mobilizations,	including	uprisings	of	various	kinds,	targeting	domestic
regimes	and	involving	participatory	and	democratic	content,	have	taken	place	increasingly	in	the	region	since	the	1970s,
responding	to	the	thinning	of	the	political	hegemony	of	the	region’s	rulers	and	regimes.	The	relevant	global	comparison,
it	has	been	argued,	is	with	people-power	uprisings	in	various	parts	of	the	world	in	recent	times	and	with	various	new
strands	in	radically	democratic	activism,	which	in	the	MENA	region	played	an	important	role	in	securing	the	unity	of	the
protesting	crowds.	The	chapter	has	argued	that	the	mass	uprisings	had	their	surprising	and	creative	dimensions:	they
emerged	without	any	preceding	state	breakdown,	and	they	constituted	the	people	as	a	sovereign,	rights-bearing,	and
diverse	subject	in	a	way	distinctive	from	anticolonial	nationalism.	The	chapter	suggests	that	while	people	power	faces
formidable	external	foes,	above	all	decision-making	located	in	the	military	and	among	its	external	backers,	the	main
internal	weakness	that	people	power	has	to	overcome	is	segmentation.	The	perspective	offered	here	suggests	that	in
the	present	and	future,	crises	and	protests	will	continue	as	long	as	political	society	and	its	external	backers	continue	to
think	and	act	in	repressive,	identitarian,	or	merely	provisionist	terms,	and	as	long	as	the	people	of	the	region’s	long	and
tenacious	search	for	more	participatory	and	democratic	political	arrangements	is	repressed.
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